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The UK was one of only three countries that granted free movement of workers to accession 
nationals following the enlargement of the European Union in May 2004. The resulting large, rapid 
and concentrated migration inflow can be seen as a natural experiment that arguably corresponds 
closely to an exogenous supply shock. We evaluate the impact of this migration inflow – one of the 
largest in British history – on the UK labour market. We use new monthly micro level data and an 
empirical approach that ascertains which particular labour markets in the UK – with varying degrees 
of native's mobility and migrants' self-selection – might have been affected. Our results suggest 
modest effects throughout the labour market. Despite anecdotal evidence, we found little hard 
evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant 
unemployment in the UK between 2004 and 2006.  
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On May 2004, ten Central and Eastern European countries joined the European 
Union (EU). The UK, along with Ireland and Sweden, were the only EU countries to 
initially grant full free movement of workers to accession nationals (Sriskandarajah 
2004; Doyle et al. 2006). Around 560,000 accession migrants joined the UK labour 
market between May 2004 and May 2006, according to the Worker Registration 
Scheme (WRS), which is roughly equivalent to 2% of total employment. This is a 
migration inflow sufficiently large – one of the largest in British history (Salt and 
Miller 2006) – and rapid to have an impact on the labour market. It has been 
suggested, for example, that this inflow is part of the explanation for the 96,000 
rise in the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) claimant unemployment during the same 
period (The Telegraph 2006; CIPD 2005). It has also been suggested that this 
inflow depressed wages (Blanchflower et al. 2007; The Economist 2006a).  
We evaluate the impact of this new migration inflow on the UK labour market. 
Using new micro level monthly WRS and JSA data, as well as data from the 
Annual Survey on Hours and Earnings (ASHE), we estimate the effect of this 
migration inflow on the distribution of wages and on claimant unemployment. 
Despite anecdotal evidence, we found little hard evidence that the inflow of 
accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant 
unemployment in the UK between 2004 and 2006. This is in line with evidence in 
the international (mainly US) literature of little or no effect on employment and 
wages (Chiswick 1978; Grossman 1982; LaLonde and Topel 1991; Altonji and 
Card 1991; Pischke and Velling 1997; Friedberg 2001; Card 2001, 2005 and 2007; 
Dustmann et al. 2005 and 2007; Carrasco et al. 2008), though in contrast with 
other evidence of more adverse effects (Borjas 1999, 2003 and 2006; Angrist and 
Kugler 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). As we discuss below, the disagreement 
in the literature is underlined by an ongoing debate on several identification issues.  
This new evidence is an important contribution to the literature and to 
policymaking. Firstly, there is currently very limited evidence on migration effects 
on the UK (Dustmann et al. 2005; Dustmann and Glitz 2005; Anderson et al. 2006; 
Drinkwater et al. 2006; Manacorda et al. 2006; Home Office 2007) – even less so 
on the recent EU enlargement. Therefore, this paper helps to fill a gap in the 
literature and contributes to informing policymaking on the face of further EU 
  1enlargements. Secondly, we exploit a new and large source of data on migration 
(WRS), which combined with claimant unemployment data (JSA), gives invaluable 
insights into the UK labour market at fine disaggregation (district and month) 
levels. Given that paucity of suitable data is one of the main reasons for scarce 
evidence for the UK, this paper is a timely contribution.  
Thirdly, the large, rapid and concentrated inflow of accession migrants can be 
seen as a natural experiment that arguably corresponds more closely to an 
exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks studied in the literature (Card 
1990 and 2007; Friedberg 2001; Dustman and Glitz 2005). This helps to 
circumvent identification issues arising from migrants' self-selection and native's 
mobility (Chiswick 1991 1992 and 1993; Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 
1991; Friedberg and Hunt 1995: Borjas 1999 and 2006; Card 2001). Similar in 
nature to the 1990's inflow of Cubans to Miami and Russians to Israel (Card 1990; 
Friedberg 2001; Hunt 1992; Carrington and Lima 1996), accession nationals chose 
to migrate because of conditions in their home countries. The timing of the inflow 
did not depend on economic conditions in the UK. Also, many chose the UK 
because other countries imposed restrictions and because of factors such as 
language, existing clusters, etc. (Bartel and Koch 1991; Dustmann et al. 2003a; 
Doyle et al. 2006; Pollard et al. 2008). Within the UK, their initial location and 
occupational choice was primarily driven by such clusters and by other labour 
market barriers (LaLonde and Topel 1991; Card and DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 
2001), and not by particularly favourable local labour market conditions.  
Finally, we use an empirical approach whereby we ascertain which particular 
labour markets in the UK might have been affected. Establishing which natives 
compete with migrants is central to identifying the effect of migration on wages and 
employment (Card 2001; Borjas 1999). This is because the extent to which any 
such effects can be identified depends on how mobile natives are across areas, 
occupations, etc., in response to migration inflows. If natives avoid competing with 
migrants by moving away – i.e. if they skip the treatment – potential adverse 
effects in a particular labour market might be offset. We argue that our treatment 
groups were fully treated because they received relatively high proportions of 
migrants and are arguably relatively closed markets, where natives' mobility is 
limited. We also argue that our control groups were relatively uncontaminated 
  2because they received relatively low proportions of migrants and arguably 
constitute a clear counterfactual. Furthermore, as the accession migration inflow 
was larger and faster than anticipated (Dustmann et al. 2003a), any natives' 
mobility response is probably lagged enough to allow identification of more 
adverse effects (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Card and DiNardo 2000; Card 2001; 
Borjas 2006). This is in line with our estimates below of a small effect of the 
accession migration inflow on internal natives' netflows (Hatton and Tani 2005).  
We thoroughly discuss the above issues in the remainder of this paper. In 
Section 2 we depict our data. In Section 3 we describe our empirical approach and 
carefully discuss several identification issues. In Section 4 we specify our empirical 
model and in Section 5 we examine the results and perform a number of 
robustness checks. In Section 6 we summarize and discuss the results in light of 
the existing literature before we conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Data   
2.1 Sources  
The migration data we use is from the Home Office administered Worker 
Registration Scheme (WRS). Registration, in addition to being a legal requirement, 
offers incentives such as certain social security benefits (Home Office 2004; Doyle 
et al. 2006). As a result, compliance is high, with 560,000 registrations between 
May 2004 and May 2006 (Browley 2005; Blanchflower et al. 2007).
1 The vast 
majority of these workers arrived post-accession, though those already in the 
country could formalise their status (Gilpin et al. 2006). The left panel of Figure 1 
shows the monthly WRS inflow between May 2004 and May 2006. The trend is 
downwards in 2004, dipping in December (7,950), and upwards in 2005, peaking in 
November (33,784). Numbers fell in the first half of 2006 (to around 23,000).  
The WRS is rich, large, frequent and timely. It records nationality, address, age, 
gender, number of dependents, application date, entry date, start of work date, 
hourly wage rate, hours worked, sector, occupation and industry. Table 1 shows 
that most WRS migrants are young, male, Polish, childless, in London, working full 
                                            
1 The typical migrant enters the UK, finds a job, and then applies to the WRS. We use "start of work 
date" to best capture labour market effects, whereas Gilpin et al. (2006) use "entry date" and the 
Home Office (2006) uses "application date", which explains different figures across studies.  
  3time in elementary and machine operative occupations low pay jobs in 
manufacturing and catering (also see Home Office 2006; Blanchflower et al. 2007; 
Pollard et al. 2008). We restrict our sample to eight accession countries (A8), 
namely: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, as Malta and Cyprus already had relative access to the EU labour 
market. A caveat with the WRS is that it measures inflows only, as migrants are 
not required to de-register when leaving the UK, and thus the associated netflow 
and stock cannot be calculated.
2  
The unemployment data we use is from the Department for Work and Pensions 
administered Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA). Registration is a legal requirement to 
qualify for the benefit, and therefore compliance is full. Between May 2004 and 
May 2006 JSA claimant unemployment rose by roughly 96,000. The left panel of 
Figure 1 shows the monthly JSA stock during this period. Casual observation 
suggests perhaps a negative association between the JSA stock and the WRS 
inflow in 2006 but not before. Claimant unemployment decreased during 2003-
2004, dipping in December (803,029), and remained stable during 2005, despite a 
continuous and growing inflow of migrants. In the first half of 2006 it increased, 
peaking in March (989,136), while migration decreased. 
The JSA is large, frequent and timely, and like the WRS, permits 
disaggregation at fine (district and month) levels.
3 This is in contrast with the more 
widely used Labour Force Survey (LFS), where migration analysis below the 
region and quarter level is not feasible due to sample size limitations. Furthermore, 
the JSA measures claimant unemployment, which is directly relevant for 
policymaking. The JSA records address, gender, age, usual and sought 
                                            
2  The WRS records jobs, not people; migrants leaving are not counted whereas migrants re-
entering the UK are double counted (Coats 2008; Pollard et al. 2008). Blanchflower et al. (2007) 
analyze A8 migration figures across several data sources and conclude that a stock of 500,000 by 
late 2006 is likely to be an upper bound. Browley (2005), Pollard et al. (2008) and Coats (2008) 
provide similar analysis and conclude that outflow is not zero, in line with evidence on return 
migration (Chiswick and Hatton 2003; Dustmann 2003; LaLonde and Topel 1997). If outflow is not 
random,   in Equation 1 could be biased (see Sections 3.2, 4 and 5.4). Gilpin et al. (2006) 
provide a detailed discussion on measurement error in the WRS and conclude that any associated 
bias is not too severe. Another caveat with the WRS is that registration is not a requirement for the 
self-employed (who are a minority that already had relative access to the EU labour market prior to 
accession), which explains the larger number of Polish plumbers in anecdotal evidence (The 
Economist 2006b; Home Office 2007).  
n β
3 The ONS-defined geographical areas we use are: 409 Local Authority Districts, 49 counties and 
12 Government Regions (ONS 2003) (see Table 1). 
  4occupations, claim start and end dates. Table 1 shows that most JSA unemployed 
are over 35 years old, female, in London and work in elementary occupation low 
pay jobs (also see Layard et al. 1991; Machin and Manning 1999).  
The wage data we use is from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) collected by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The ASHE is derived 
from employers' data and represents 1% of all employees, containing around 
160,000 responses per year. It collects, among other variables, address, gender, 
age, hourly pay, hours worked, occupation and industry. Table 1 shows various 
percentiles and the average of the ASHE and WRS hourly wage distributions, 
whereas Figure 2 plots both distributions for those earning £7 or below. The WRS 
distribution 50
th percentile is roughly lined up with the ASHE distribution 5
th 
percentile (see Table 1). This indicates that the typical WRS migrant earns around 
the minimum wage, which is also the wage for the lowest paid UK workers. The left 
panel of Figure 2 shows a sizeable spike at the minimum wage in the WRS 
distribution, which dwarfs the spike in the ASHE distribution. It also shows how 
remarkably compressed the WRS distribution is: over 90% (75%) of migrants earn 
between £2.00 (£4.00) and £7.00 an hour. While the average wage is £5.56 for a 
WRS migrant, it is £12.57 for a UK worker, though caution should be taken here, 
as ASHE includes WRS migrants after 2004.  
Finally, we use data from the LFS to define control variables that describe the 
native's population. ("Natives" here and throughout the paper include UK born and 
overseas born nationals who are UK residents.) The LFS is a rotating panel survey 
that interviews around 60,000 households with about 140,000 respondents every 
quarter and represents 0.5% of the population. It collects information on personal 
characteristics and labour market variables. Table 1 summarizes some variables 
from the LFS between April 2004 and June 2006.  
 
2.2 Descriptive Analysis 
In early 2004 the UK labour market was performing well historically and 
internationally (Coats 2008). The right panel of Figure 1 shows the trend for quarter 
rolling average employment rates between April 2001 and April 2006. The overall 
employment rate in May 2004 was 74.7%, one of the highest on record, while 
claimant unemployment was 2.7% (or 858,100), one of the lowest since 1975 
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Although employment continued to grow, with low redundancy and high vacancy 
levels (Home Office 2007), claimant (ILO) unemployment increased by roughly 
96,000 (250,000) between May 2004 and May 2006. As this rise coincided with 
substantial A8 migration, some suggested an association between the two 
phenomena (The Telegraph 2006; CIPD 2005). Nonetheless, despite the 
continuing migration inflow, the labour market began to recover in late 2006, with 
ILO and claimant unemployment falling (Lemos and Portes 2008; The Economist 
2007). This is in line with our analysis in Section 2.1, which offers little evidence of 
a negative association between claimant unemployment and WRS migration.  
Likewise, Figure 1 shows that the substantial rise in the employment rate of A8 
migrants since 2004 does not appear to be associated with a fall in the 
employment rates of UK born or non-UK born. The dip in the A8 employment rate 
in 2003 suggests that migrants deferred their decisions to join the UK labour 
market to take advantage of the new accession status, which was announced in 
December 2002 (Doyle et al. 2006). The employment rate is highest for A8 
migrants, perhaps because of their younger age, though some argue this is 
because of their skills, higher productivity and better work ethic (more reliability, 
less sick leave, longer working hours, etc.) (see Table 1), while a few argue this is 
because of their lower wage costs (Home Office 2007; House of Lords 2008; 
Dustmann et al. 2003b).  
Figure 3 also offers little evidence of a negative association between WRS 
migration and monthly average wage growth nationally or for manufacturing and 
services. Moreover, Figure 3 suggests little evidence of depressed wages at other 
points of the wage distribution. It instead shows wage growth throughout, relatively 
more generous at the very bottom of the distribution in 2005 – where it is probably 
driven by minimum wage increases. This is also illustrated in the right panel of 
Figure 2, which shows the wage distribution change for those earning below £7.  
In mid 2003 there were around 110,000 A8 nationals in the UK, of which 60,000 
were Polish. Poland is the largest A8 country and has one of the weakest labour 
markets (Dustmann et al. 2003a). So it is perhaps not surprising that the Polish 
comprise 61% of the WRS migrants, followed by the Lithuanians (12%). Over 75% 
of working age A8 nationals lived in London and the South East prior to accession. 
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inflows (respectively 17% and 14%) (see Table 1 and Figure 4). Given the 
disproportionate numbers of WRS migrants and claimants in London, it is likely 
that both groups compete for the same jobs and three obvious questions arise.  
The first question is whether migrants pushed natives out of (or prevented 
natives to move into) London. Figure 5 shows that natives' netflow between May 
2004 and May 2006 is negative in London and positive elsewhere, though this is a 
long term trend that precedes accession (Hatton and Tani 2005; Lemos and Portes 
2008). Figure 5 also shows that natives' netflow in London was less negative after 
May 2004 than before. This suggests that, if anything, less natives (not more) were 
pushed out of London after accession (see Sections 3.2 and 5.3), though caution 
should be taken here due to limitations with the internal migration indicators data 
(Lemos and Portes 2008). The second question is whether migrants pushed 
natives out of their jobs or made it harder for them to go back into jobs in London. 
Figure 1 shows a continuing inflow of migrants but a relatively stable number of 
claimants in London (see Sections 3.2 and 5.1). The third question is whether 
migrants depressed wages (Blanchflower et al. 2007). Wages grew slower in 
London between 2005 and 2006 (2.7%) than in the rest of the country (4.4%), 
which might suggest a negative association between wage growth and WRS 
migration (see Sections 3.2 and 5.6). 
WRS migrants concentrate predominantly in low skilled jobs, in contrast with 
earlier more skilled migrants (Dustmann et al. 2005). The most popular sectors are 
manufacturing (31%) and distribution hotels and restaurants (27%), where WRS 
migrants represent less than 2% of total employment (Gilpin et al. 2006). The most 
popular occupations are elementary (46%) and machine operatives (32%) (see 
Table 1).
4 The obvious question is again whether migrants pushed natives out of, 
or made it harder for them to go back into these occupations. Figure 6 shows that 
despite the continuing inflow of migrants into machine operatives, more claimants 
switched to this from other (usual) occupations.
5 Also, wages grew faster in 
machine operatives between 2005 and 2006 (3.8%) than in elementary (2.7%) or 
                                            
4 We use the nine Standard Occupation Codes: 1 Managerial and senior officials, 2 Professional, 3 
Associate professional and technical, 4 Administrative and secretarial, 5 Skilled trades, 6 Personal 
service, 7 Sales and customer service, 8 Process plant and machine operatives and 9 Elementary.  
5 We observe both usual and sought occupation for the claimant unemployed, thus overcoming a 
common difficulty in the literature, where occupation is often not observed (Card 2001). 
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driven both migrants and claimants into machine operative jobs.  
Although there is no indication of demand side factors attracting migrants into 
elementary occupations, this is probably where they were most able to find jobs 
because of language or other labour market barriers (Card and DiNardo 2000; 
Friedberg 2001; Drinkwater et al. 2006). This is also the usual occupation for most 
claimants (35%) and Figure 6 shows that some of them switched from looking for 
jobs in (usual) elementary to other (sought) occupations. The switch could either 
be because natives were pushed out or because of other factors, including 
occupational progression, sectoral or occupational shocks, macro shocks, etc., 
which we account for in our empirical model in Section 4. An example of such 
shocks, as discussed above, is the claimant unemployment increase across all 
occupations in early 2006, which hints at macro effects in addition to any WRS 
migration effects.  
In sum, the inflow of WRS migrants in London and in elementary occupations 
represents a large, concentrated and rapid enough shock to have an impact on 
unemployment and wages. We exploit these location and occupation choices to 
ensure identification in our empirical model, as we discuss in Sections 3 and 4. 
  
3. Empirical Approach 
3.1 Experiment  Design 
The large, rapid and concentrated inflow of WRS migrants documented in 
Section 2 can be seen as a natural experiment that arguably corresponds more 
closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks studied in the 
literature (Card 1990 and 2007; Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991; 
Friedberg 2001; Dustman and Glitz 2005). This helps to circumvent identification 
issues arising from migrants' self-selection to labour markets experiencing more 
favourable conditions (Card 1990 and 2005; Borjas 2003). Similar in nature to the 
1990's inflow of Cubans to Miami and Russians to Israel (Card 1990; Friedberg 
2001; Hunt 1992; Carrington and Lima 1996), accession nationals chose to 
migrate because of conditions in their home countries. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
the timing of the inflow did not depend on economic conditions in the UK (see 
  8Figure 1). Also, many chose the UK because other countries imposed restrictions 
and because of factors such as language, culture, existing clusters, etc. (Bartel 
and Koch 1991; Dustmann et al. 2003a; Doyle et al. 2006; Pollard et al. 2008).  
Within the UK, WRS migrants' initial location and occupational choice in London 
and elementary occupations was primarily driven by existing clusters and by 
language or other labour market barriers (LaLonde and Topel 1991; Card and 
DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 2001; Drinkwater et al. 2006) and not by particularly 
favourable conditions in these labour markets (see Section 2.2). This is in contrast 
with migrants' self-selection into machine operatives, which might have been 
demand driven, as discussed in Section 2.2. Because machine operatives might 
have been hit simultaneously by demand (e.g. booming construction industry) and 
supply shocks (e.g. WRS migration inflow), we perform robustness checks 
excluding it from our regression models in Section 5.5. We also perform 
robustness checks using alternative models and techniques to account for 
potentially remaining self-selection bias in Sections 4 and 5.
6 
In addition to corresponding to a relatively exogenous supply shock, the WRS 
inflow was large, rapid and concentrated into relatively closed markets; it therefore 
arguably warrants clearly defined treatment and control groups. This helps to 
circumvent identification issues arising from natives' mobility in response to the 
inflow (Chiswick 1991 1992 and 1993; Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 
1991; Friedberg and Hunt 1995: Borjas 1999 and 2006; Card 2001). We now 
carefully argue that the treatment groups (in turn, elementary occupations and 
London) were fully exposed to the treatment, and that the associated control 
groups (other occupations and regions) were uncontaminated by the treatment 
(migrants). That is, natives in the treatment group did compete with migrants, and 
natives in the control group skipped the treatment and did not compete with 
migrants.  
Clearly ascertaining which natives belong in each group is key to our 
identification strategy. As Card (2001) notes, establishing "who competes with 
whom" is central to identifying the effect of migration on wages and employment. 
This is because the extent to which such effects can be identified depends on how 
                                            
6 For example, although early cohorts' location choices were primarily driven by existing clusters, 
subsequent cohorts might have self-selected into areas experiencing more favourable conditions 
(Bartel and Koch 1991; Zavodny 1999; Gurak and Kritz 2000; Gilpin et al. 2006).  
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migration inflows – or the extent to which the treatment group skips treatment. If 
natives respond to the inflow through increased mobility, potential adverse effects 
in a particular labour market might be offset. This undermines identification 
because we do not observe what would have been the wages and employment 
level had natives not fled (a fully treated treatment group). Furthermore, we do not 
normally observe what would have been the wages and employment level had 
migrants not flooded in (the counterfactual or a credible control group).  
In our data we observe migrant inflows of different intensities into relatively 
closed labour markets and this arguably provides suitable treatment and control 
groups. One example is that elementary occupations received substantially more 
migrants (46%) than other occupations (1% to 6% excluding machine operatives). 
In addition, most competing low-skilled natives might not have immediate access 
to jobs in other occupations, as this often requires retraining (Friedberg 2001; 
Borjas 2003) (some limited mobility here derives from occupational progression, 
which we control for in our regression models, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 4). 
Consequently, the treatment group was fully treated because elementary 
occupations received relatively high proportions of migrants and are arguably 
relatively closed markets, where natives' mobility is limited. And the control group 
was fairly uncontaminated because other occupations received relatively low 
proportions of migrants and therefore arguably constitute a clear counterfactual.  
Another example is that while London received relatively high proportions of 
migrants, other areas received varying degrees of the treatment. One interpretation 
here is to treat all areas as treatment groups, exploiting the variation in the 
proportion of migrants across areas and time. Table 1 and Figure 4 show a great 
deal of variation both across regions (1% to 17%) and across time. One concern 
here, as in much of the literature, is that London might not have received a full 
course of the treatment – i.e. that some natives moved out of London and skipped 
the treatment. As discussed in Section 2.2, we found little evidence that natives 
responded to the migration inflow by moving out (or refraining to move into) 
London (see Figure 5 and Section 5.3). Furthermore, as the migration inflow was 
larger and faster than anticipated (Dustmann et al. 2003a), any natives' mobility 
response is probably lagged enough to allow identification of more adverse effects 
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Finally, WRS migrants concentrate in low paid jobs (see Table 1) and thus 
compete with low-skilled natives, who are more area-bound because the cost-
benefit of cross-regional mobility is often prohibitive (Borjas 1999; McCormick 
1997). This effectively means that they compete in a relatively more closed market. 
As the boundaries of the actual radius of job search for low-skilled natives is an 
empirical matter, we experiment with several levels of aggregation – i.e. several 
degrees of natives' mobility – allowing the search to take place on ever wider 
labour markets (Borjas 2006) (see Section 3.2). We also provide a number of 
robustness checks using alternative models and techniques to account for 
potentially remaining natives' mobility bias in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
3.2 Aggregation  Level 
Ideally, the level of data aggregation should conform to the actual radius of job 
search for natives competing with migrants. However, most studies for the UK use 
data from the LFS, where migration analysis below the region and quarter level is 
not feasible due to sample size limitations (see Section 2.1). The implicit 
assumption in these studies is that there are 12 regional closed labour markets in 
the UK, where the whole of London – in whose 33 districts 41% (17%) of all (WRS) 
migrants are unevenly distributed – is treated as one data point (see Table 1).  
We overcome this weakness in the literature by exploiting large datasets (WRS, 
JSA and ASHE) that permit disaggregation at finer levels. We begin by assuming 
that there are 409 closed labour market districts in the UK. While districts are 
unlikely to exactly coincide with local labour markets, they might represent a more 
realistic practical radius of job search than regions for most low-skilled natives 
competing with WRS migrants (see Section 3.1). We use work address for WRS 
migrants and ASHE workers – to eliminate concerns that they might live in one 
district and work in another – and home address for JSA claimants, who we 
assume, search for jobs primarily in their neighbourhood. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that claimants live in one district and search for jobs in another, as 
districts are close and commuting costs are relatively low in big cities.  
Thus, we next relax the assumption that districts are independent and closed 
labour markets by aggregating the data across 49 counties. While counties are 
  11unlikely to coincide with local labour markets throughout the country, they might 
represent a realistic practical radius of job search to relatively area-bound low-
skilled natives in big cities who are likely to choose districts near by (within the 
same county) to commute or move to. Thus counties can be regarded as more 
closed labour markets than districts (Borjas 2006). Likewise, regions can be 
regarded as more closed labour markets than counties. Therefore, we end by 
aggregating the data across regions to check the robustness of our results and for 
comparability with the literature.  
In sum, we use three levels of aggregation, in turn: districts, counties and 
regions. By changing the level of aggregation, we are changing the boundaries of 
the radius of job search – i.e. the degree of natives' mobility – and allowing the 
search to take place on ever wider labour markets (Borjas 2006). Our final level of 
aggregation is the national level, as we discuss below, which scrapes all 
boundaries – allowing natives full mobility within the country – and is therefore 
more robust to natives' mobility bias (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Dustmann and 
Glitz 2005).  
The idea is that the greater the degree of natives' mobility, the larger the 
associated estimate bias across different aggregation levels (Borjas 2006).  If 
natives are district-bound then estimates at the district, county or region level 
should not differ much. If however, natives are mobile across districts, but not 
across counties, potentially adverse effects are offset at the district level but 
uncovered at the county level. Similarly, effects offset at the county (region) level 
might be uncovered at the region (nation) level. In addition to accessing the extent 
of natives' mobility bias by aggregating the data at different levels, we also perform 
robustness checks using alternative models (e.g. explicitly controlling for natives' 
mobility) and techniques (e.g. instrumental variables) in Sections 4 and 5. 
The implicit assumption so far is that all WRS migrants compete with all natives 
in each area (district, county and region), which might not be realistic. That is 
because the vast majority of WRS migrants do not compete with highly skilled 
natives. We relax this assumption by assuming that WRS migrants are only 
substitutes for low-skilled natives within each area. We also experiment with other 
vulnerable groups, such as female and young natives. Here, the assumption is that 
WRS migrants are only substitutes for female (young) natives within each area. 
  12We also relax the assumption that all WRS migrants compete with all natives by 
assuming that low-skilled (high-skilled) WRS migrants compete with low-skilled 
(high-skilled) natives in a national market. That is, we aggregate the data across 
occupations and assume that migrants and natives are only substitutes within 
occupations (Card 2001; Friedberg 2001). Furthermore, given that the majority of 
WRS migrants concentrate in elementary occupations, and given that low-skilled 
natives are relatively region-bound, our final assumption is that migrants and 
natives are only substitutes within occupations within regions. The main difference 
is that at the national-occupation level, migrant and native cleaners, say, compete 
across the country; whereas at the regional-occupation level, migrant and native 
cleaners compete in London only, for example. Given that crossing the country for 
a cleaning job might not be financially viable for a native, it might be more realistic 
to stratify the labour market at the regional-occupation level than at the national-
occupation level for the particular phenomenon we study here (see Section 3.1). 
As before, if low-skilled natives are relatively region-bound, then estimates at both 
levels not differ much.  
Stratification across occupations is particularly fruitful because migrants and 
natives compete more directly across occupations than across areas (Card 2001). 
In addition, natives' mobility bias and migrants' self-selection bias are less of a 
concern across occupations. Firstly, occupations are more closed labour markets 
than areas because occupation mobility often requires retraining (Friedberg 2001; 
Borjas 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). Secondly, migrants' initial occupational 
choice is often driven by language or other labour market barriers (Friedberg 2001; 
Dustmann and Glitz 2005). Both factors are particularly relevant in our data, as we 
discussed in Section 3.1, because the treatment is concentrated in low-skilled 
elementary occupations.
7  
                                            
7 Several skill definitions have been used in the literature, e.g. occupation, education, education-
experience, etc. (Card 2001; Borjas 2003; Dustmann and Glitz 2005). Occupation is measured 
more accurately than education and experience. Firstly, the extent and quality of education varies 
across countries. Therefore, migrants and natives in the same 20 years education cell might have 
different skills and compete for different jobs. Secondly, occupation measures the effective reward 
the migrant obtains, after usual skill downgrading due to language or other labour market barriers 
(Card and DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 2001; Drinkwater et al. 2006; Dustmann et al. 2007). For 
example, a migrant journalist might initially work as a cleaner, and thus is not competing with native 
journalists. Thirdly, there is evidence that natives and migrants are imperfect substitutes within 
education groups in the UK (Manacorda et al. 2006). As discussed above, identifying accurately 
who competes with whom is crucial, as poor skill group allocation results in poor identification.  
  13In sum, we exploit a number of ways of stratifying local labour markets. We 
experiment not only with various levels of aggregation (district, county, region, 
nation-occupation and region-occupation) but also with alternative demographic 
groups (low-skilled, young and female). By altering our assumptions on 
substitutability between migrants and natives, we consider a number of local labour 
markets where migrants might be affecting natives. As in much of the literature, we 
relate migrant densities to natives' wages and claimant unemployment across 
these labour markets to establish whether those that received relatively more 
migrants experienced more adverse effects. The magnitude of any such adverse 
effects depends on the degree of substitutability between migrants and natives.  
Figure 7 plots our claimant unemployment (netflow) rate variable   against 
our migration (inflow) rate variable   across t months (between May 2004 and 
April 2006) and   districts (i is, in turn, districts, counties, regions and 
occupations). In line with our analysis at the national level in Section 2, this 
suggests little evidence of a negative association between the two variables at the 
district, county, region or nation-occupation level. The raw data suggests that 
claimant unemployment did not grow faster in areas and occupations that received 
relatively more migrants. Figure 7 also plots the average (and 10
th percentile) of 
the distribution of log hourly pay   in first-difference across   years (2004 to 
2006) and i districts against the yearly migration rate  . Again, in line with our 
analysis at the national level in Section 2, this suggests little evidence of a negative 
association between the two variables at the district level. The raw data suggests 
that wages did not grow slower in districts that received relatively more migrants. 
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natives are not district-bound but are county and region-bound (see Section 3.2).
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 is the number (stock) of WRS migrants, and   is working age population. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, whereas we observe the stock of claimants and can calculate the netflow of claimants 
as  ; we do not observe the stock of migrants. We thus re-define the netflow of 
migrants as  , where   is inflow and   is outflow of migrants. As we do not 
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  14The above correlations offer little support to standard theory predictions that 
migration inflows exert downwards pressure on wages and employment. However, 
such raw correlations need to be proved robust when the effect of other variables 
(demand and supply shocks, area and occupation specific shocks, etc.) on wages 
and claimant unemployment is accounted for. We control for such variables in our 
regression models in Sections 4 and 5, where we further discuss associated 
identification issues and robustness checks. 
 
4. Model Specification  
We estimate the effect of the WRS migration inflow on the UK claimant 
unemployment netflow using a reduced form equation grounded on standard 
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where   and   are our unemployment and migration variables, defined in 
Section 3.2,   are labour demand and supply shifters,   is time fixed effects, 
and   is the error term in district 





it ε 409 ,..., 1 = i  and month-year  . The 
interpretation of our coefficient of interest is that a one percentage point increase in 
the migration rate changes the claimant unemployment rate by   percentage 
points.  
24 ,..., 1 = t
n β
As we estimate Equation 1 in first-difference, area fixed effects were differenced 
out. This way we remove any permanent differences across districts and make 
them equally attractive. In other words, we control for specific factors in a district 
(such as more schools, more housing, higher wages, etc.) that might make it more 
attractive to migrants or natives or both. This enables us to separate the effect of 
district specific factors from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant 
unemployment. We model time fixed effects using 24 month-year dummies. This 
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∆  and   , where   is 
inflow and   is outflow of natives. We also run robustness checks where our migration and 
unemployment variables in Equation 1 were not standardized (i.e. re-defining   and 
) and found qualitatively similar results (Peri and Sparber 2008). 
  15enables us to separate the effect of other macro shocks (such as seasonal shocks, 
national and international shocks, etc.) from the effect of the WRS shock on 
claimant unemployment. Incidentally, controlling for both area and time fixed 
effects helps to correct for migrants' self-selection (omitted variable) bias and 
natives' mobility (omitted variable) bias (see Section 5.2). 
We also control for demand and supply shifters. This enables us to separate the 
effect of demand and supply shocks from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant 
unemployment. Incidentally this helps to control for factors that might motivate 
income-maximizing natives to move to other districts and thus helps to correct for 
natives' mobility (omitted variable) bias (Borjas 2006). Controls in   include the 
proportion of the total population who are women, young (those between 18 and 
24 years of age), ethnic minorities and migrants from outside the A8 countries. 
This enables us to control for higher unemployment in a particular district due to 
the presence of relatively more women, young, minorities or other migrants – 
which are groups who often experience high unemployment (see Section 2). 
Further controls include the lagged proportion of WRS migrants who are women, 
young and parents (along with average number of children). We also control for the 
lagged average hours worked by WRS migrants to account for potentially higher 
claimant unemployment in districts where migrants work longer hours (which might 
increase substitutability). We also include the lagged proportion of WRS migrants 
in elementary and machine operative occupations to control for occupation-district 
specific shocks affecting claimant unemployment. Finally, we include the lagged 
proportion of unemployed who are women and young, and lagged average claim 
duration. Lagged claim duration accounts for higher unemployment in districts with 
historically long spells of unemployment; it also alleviates problems arising from 




Next, we control for natives' mobility. This allows us to separate the effect of the 
WRS shock on claimant unemployment from the effect of natives moving away 
                                            
9 As in Gilpin et al. (2006), we experimented with two types of dynamics (lagged migration rate and 
lagged claimant unemployment rate), which, however, did not alter our main result. Although 
dynamics allow for lagged adjustments due to slow responses in employment, migration effects are 
generally expected to be lower in the longer than in the shorter run (Altonji and Card 1991; 
Dustmann et al. 2005).  
  16from (or refraining to move into) a district. Put differently, this allows us to some 
extent to build a counterfactual of how mobile natives would have been in the 
absence of the migration inflow. Therefore, it helps to correct for both natives' 
mobility (omitted variable) bias and migrants' self selection (omitted variable) bias 
(see Sections 3 and 5.2). The severity of any such omitted variable bias depends 
on the extent of the correlation between the migrant inflow and natives' netflow 
(see Section 5.3). Therefore, this is ultimately an empirical matter and will vary 
according to the particular phenomenon studied (Card and DiNardo 2000; Card 
2001; Borjas 2003 and 2006; Dustmann and Glitz 2005). 
It follows that, ideally, we want to use a variable that measures what would have 
been the observed natives' net migration had migrants not arrived – which would 
also introduce the initial labour market pre-accession conditions into the regression 
analysis (Borjas 1999 and 2006). As such counterfactual is not observable, we add 
two observable proxies to  , in turn. The first proxy we use is lagged working 
age population growth (Borjas et al. 1997; Borjas 2006) – which incidentally 
ensures that the variation in   that identifies   comes from the numerator 
(migration inflow) and not from the denominator (working age population) (Borjas 
2003). To avoid repeating the dependent variable as a regressor, we use lagged 
working age population growth by education group (Dustmann et al. 2005; Borjas 
2006; Peri and Sparber 2008).
10 The second proxy we use is the native netflow 





We perform a Generalized Least Square (GLS) correction to account for the 
relative importance of each district, for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation, 
and for serial correlation across and within districts.
11 Given such stringent 
specifications, and given the careful consideration of our treatment and control 
groups (see Section 3), we argue that the remaining variation in the claimant 
                                            
10 We use a group comprising those with a degree or equivalent and above, a group comprising 
those with GCSE or equivalent and below, and a group comprising those in between; the last was 
omitted in alternative robustness checks, which did not alter the main results. 
11 The appropriate weight here is the sample size used to calculate the dependent variable 
(working age population), but our estimates were robust to using total population as weight instead 
– which reduces concerns of a potential correlation between the weight and the dependent variable 
affecting the results. (Also, as discussed in Section 3.2, we run robustness checks where our 
unemployment and migration variables were not standardized and found qualitatively similar 
results.) Our estimates were also robust to using, in turn, April 2004 working age population and 
April 2004 total population as time-invariant weight (Card 2001 and 2005; Borjas 2006).  
  17unemployment rate is likely due to changes in the WRS migration inflow – and this 




5.1 Unemployment  Effects 
Row 1 of Panel A of Table 2 shows an insignificant -0.015 (unweighted OLS) 
 estimate, which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 7. The insignificant         
-0.044 estimate in row 2 is our baseline (GLS) estimate. It accounts for district 
specific time invariant factors that might simultaneously affect both the 
unemployment and migration rates, such as the fact that more multicultural or 
higher wage districts (e.g. in London) attract both migrants and natives. However, 
this single-difference model does not account for macro month specific effects that 
might simultaneously affect both the unemployment and migration rates, such as 
interest rate changes or international shocks. Controlling for such macro effects is 
equivalent to a double-difference model, which produces a more negative, though 
still insignificant -0.051 estimate in row 3.  
n β
Further controlling for other demand and supply shocks in row 4 yields a 0.037 
estimate, which however, remains insignificant. This suggests that the earlier 
negative sign was driven by omitted variables varying across district-month over 
and above district specific and month specific fixed effects. This indicates that our 
control variables (such as the length of unemployment spells, the proportion of 
women and young on a district, etc.) are important factors explaining the UK 
claimant unemployment rate.  
The estimate remains positive and insignificant, 0.020 and 0.003, when we 
control for lagged working age population growth in row 5 and for native netflow 
rate in row 6. These estimates are still small – if anything, smaller – offering little 
evidence that natives' mobility offset potentially more adverse effects, in line with 
our earlier descriptive analysis (see Sections 2.2, 3 and 5.3). The   estimate 
remained fairly robust across specifications (compare the more complete ones in 
rows 4-6). Thus, our results indicate little evidence of adverse claimant 
unemployment effects at the district level.  
n β
In addition to accessing the extent of any natives' mobility omitted variable bias 
  18by explicitly controlling for lagged working age population growth and native 
netflow rate, we now access whether they are area-bound by aggregating the data 
at the county and region levels, in turn. (We also re-estimate our models using 
instrumental variables in Section 5.2). If natives' mobility is not exacerbated by the 
migration inflow, estimates at the district, county, and region levels should not differ 
much (see Section 3.2). Panels B and C show that the estimates at the county and 
region levels are also positive and insignificant, and as before, get smaller in the 
more complete specifications. The region estimates are twice larger than the 
county estimates, which are twice larger than the district estimates (compare row 4 
of Panels A to C). This might be interpreted as evidence of natives' mobility 
offsetting more adverse effects at the district and county levels (Borjas 2006). 
However, this evidence is weak. Firstly, because although the estimates are 
numerically larger the wider the aggregation level, they are small in magnitude and 
are statistically indifferent from zero. Although Figure 7 suggested that natives are 
not district-bound, we were unable to uncover larger and significant effects at the 
county and region levels.  
Secondly, although larger estimates might be expected at wider aggregation 
levels as a result of theoretical predictions regarding natives' mobility (Borjas 2003 
and 2006), they might also be expected as a result of modelling choices (Borjas 
2006; Peri and Sparber 2006). One example is that region dummies do not control 
for as many area specific shocks as district dummies do, which might result in a 
larger   estimate at the region level. Moreover, serial correlation is more of a 
concern in more aggregate data, which again could result in a larger   estimate 
at the regional level (despite appropriate GLS corrections at each level). Another 
example is that implicit area weights differ across aggregation levels. For instance, 
at the district level, different parts of London receive different weights, and each 
district has a small weight; in contrast, at the county and region levels, London is 
treated as one single labour market (see Section 3.2). This could result on a larger 




In sum, our main conclusion is that there is little evidence that an increase in the 
WRS migration rate adversely affected the claimant unemployment rate in the UK 
between 2004 and 2006. Our results are in line with the international literature, 
  19where adverse employment effects are small (Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde and 
Topel 1991; Friedberg 2001; Card 1990, 2001 and 2005; Dustmann and Glitz 
2005; Carrasco et al. 2008). They are also in line with the very limited evidence for 
the UK: Dustmann et al. (2005) reported insignificant employment and 
unemployment effects using LFS data for the 1980s and 1990s. They also reported 
insignificant effects for high and low skilled workers, though small and significant 
adverse effects for the middle group. We also estimate effects for the low skilled in 
Section 5.4, and find no evidence of adverse effects.
12 Although the evidence 
discussed is reassuring so far, we probe our results further in four different ways in 
Sections 5.2 through to 5.5. 
 
5.2  Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Our uninstrumented estimates in Section 5.1 suggest little evidence of adverse 
claimant unemployment effects. While these could be consistent estimates of an 
underlying true zero effect, they could also be biased estimates of an underlying 
positive effect. We thus further check the robustness of these estimates by using 
instrumental variable estimation techniques to correct for potential bias arising from 
non-zero correlation between the error term and the migration rate.  
We begin by arguing that for the particular phenomenon we study here such 
correlation is potentially weak and thus any associated endogeneity bias is not too 
severe. Firstly, this correlation would potentially be strong if the unemployment and 
migration rates were jointly determined: if both migrants and unemployed natives 
made simultaneous decisions to join the labour market based on observed job 
opportunities. As we argued in Sections 2.2 and 3.1, the WRS migration inflow was 
a large, rapid, concentrated and relatively exogenous supply shock resulting 
mainly from political events. Secondly, this correlation would be potentially strong if 
variables driving both the migration and unemployment rates were omitted. Two 
such omitted variables are of particular concern: migrants' self-selection and 
natives' mobility. As we argue in Section 3, migrants' location choices are primarily 
driven by clusters and not by particularly favourable labour market conditions; and 
                                            
12 Although WRS migrants concentrate in low skilled elementary occupations, for completeness we 
also run robustness checks for middle and high skilled occupations and found no evidence of 
adverse effects. 
  20the correlation between the migration inflow and natives' netflow does not appear 
to be very large in our data (see Section 5.3). Furthermore, we use fairly stringent 
specifications, where we control for these (and other) omitted variables to some 
extent through fixed effects, demand and supply shifters, lagged working age 
population growth and native netflow rate. Finally, this correlation would be 
potentially strong in the presence of non-random measurement error. As discussed 
in Section 2.1, there is no a priori reason to expect non-random non-registration or 
outflow across areas in our data (see Section 5.4). 
Although none of these sources of endogeneity appears strong enough to have 
severely biased our estimates in Section 5.1, we re-estimate Equation 1 using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This requires instruments that are 
relevant, i.e. correlated with the migration rate, and not endogenous, i.e. 
uncorrelated with unobserved factors that drive the claimant unemployment rate. 
Table 3 shows GMM   estimates. We begin by using the second to sixth lags 
of our migration rate, which is a typical instrument in the literature. These lags are 
obviously correlated with the migration rate but predetermined in relation to the 
claimant unemployment rate. The associated F test in the first step of the 
estimation, in row 1 of Panel A, confirms that the instruments are relevant, though 
the Hansen-Sargan test (Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982) shows that they are invalid.  
n β
We next use the second to fifth lags of the entry-migration rate. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, the typical migrant enters the UK, finds a job, and then applies to the 
WRS. We used "start of work date" to define our migration rate and now use "entry 
date" to define our instrument. Lags of the entry-migration rate are correlated with 
the migration rate but predetermined in relation to the claimant unemployment rate. 
Row 2 shows that the instruments are again relevant and now pass the Hansen-
Sargan test. Furthermore the associated Hausman test (Hahn and Hausman 2002) 
shows no evidence of endogeneity in the model deriving from our migration rate. 
The resulting estimate is negative, small and insignificant (compare with row 4 of 
Panel A of Table 2).  
We also use another typical instrument in the literature, historic migration rate, 
defined as the pre-accession proportion of migrants in the population (Altonji and 
Card 1991; Hunt 1992; Dustmann et al. 2005). We define this instrument using 
Census data for 1991 and 2001 and also using International Passenger Survey 
  21(IPS) data for the 1990s. Once again, these instruments are correlated with the 
migration rate but predetermined in relation to the claimant unemployment rate. 
The results show no evidence of endogeneity and confirm that the instruments are 
relevant and not endogenous. The resulting estimate is small, negative and 
significant (insignificant) in row 3 (4). 
We next experiment with a more novel instrument using data from the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA). We interact a flight indicator variable – which is one if a 
flight between a particular A8 country and a particular UK district exists, and zero 
otherwise – with the distance between the two. This instrument is correlated with 
the migration rate because the more flights and the shorter the distance between 
an A8 country and a UK district, the larger the migration inflow. It is uncorrelated 
with the claimant unemployment rate because there is no reason why the 
existence of flights or the distance between A8 countries and UK districts would be 
simultaneously determined with the number of claimants. The results in row 5 
show no evidence of endogeneity and confirm that the instruments are relevant 
and not endogenous. The resulting estimate is small, negative and significant.
13 
Panels B and C show that the results at the county and region levels are 
qualitatively similar to those at the district level in Panel A, except that the   
estimate is more often insignificant and that the instruments perform better.  
n β
In sum, although the significance and magnitude vary, the estimates remain 
small; the sign is reassuringly negative throughout. Therefore, the instrumented 
estimates here suggest, if anything, less – not more – adverse effects than their 
uninstrumented counterparts in Section 5.1 (compare with row 4 of each panel in 
Table 2). This is reassuring of our earlier conclusion of little evidence of adverse 
claimant unemployment effects. Dustmann et al. (2005) also reported close (small 
                                            
13 We also experimented with other instruments derived from the CAA data, such as an alternative 
flight indicator to encompass neighbouring districts; the minimum, maximum and average air fare 
prices; the number of air fares (one way and two ways); and the number of passengers travelling 
(arriving and departing) between A8 countries and UK districts. In addition, we experimented with 
other instruments derived from the WRS (such as the number of days elapsed between entering 
the UK and finding a job) and from the JSA (such as the lagged proportion of claimants switching 
occupations). Although the associated results were qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, these 
instruments were less relevant and the estimates less precise. We further experimented with other 
instruments suggested in the literature, such as house prices, vacancies and temperature (Hatton 
and Tani 2005; Saiz 2006; Hunt 1992), however the poor quality of the data at the district and 
month level cast doubt on the results. 
 
  22and insignificant) instrumented and uninstrumented unemployment effect 
estimates, suggesting that any endogeneity bias was not too severe.  
 
5.3  Native Mobility Effects  
Of the sources of endogeneity discussed in Section 5.2, natives' mobility is 
perhaps the one that has most occupied the literature (Chiswick 1991 and 1992; 
Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991; Friedberg and Hunt 1995: Borjas 
1999 and 2006; Card and DiNardo 2000; Card 2001; Dustmann and Glitz 2005). 
We have argued that the nature of the particular phenomenon we study here 
reduces concerns that any such bias is severe, which is confirmed by our results in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2. As the severity of this bias depends on the extent of the 
correlation between the migrant inflow and natives' netflow (see Section 4), an 
alternative way to check the robustness of our results is to estimate this 
correlation.  
We thus estimate the effect of the WRS migration inflow on the UK natives' 
netflow using a reduced form equation (Card and DiNardo 2000; Hatton and Tani 










it f X M A ε λ β ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ = ∆                             ( 2 )  
where   and   are our natives' netflow and migration variables, defined in 
Section 3.2;   is time fixed effects;   is the error term; and   are controls, 
namely lagged working age population, log average wage, unemployment rate, 
average house price and vacancies. Thus, we separate the effect of a changing 
working age population from the effect of migration on natives' netflow (Wright et 
al. 1997; Card and DiNardo 2000; Hatton and Tani 2005). Similarly, we separate 
the effect of wages, unemployment, house prices and vacancies from the effect of 
migration on natives' netflow (Jackman and Savouri 1992; McCormick 1997; 
Hatton and Tani 2005; Borjas 2006). As before, we estimate Equation 2 in first-
difference using GLS. The interpretation of our coefficient of interest is that a one 
percentage point increase in the migration rate changes the native netflow rate by 
 percentage points. 








Row 1 of Panel A of Table 4 shows a -0.182 (unweighted OLS) insignificant   
a β
  23estimate, which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 7. Our baseline (GLS) 
estimate in row 2, where district fixed effects are controlled for, is a significant        
-0.282. Further controlling for month fixed effects in row 3 yields a significant and 
larger -0.301 estimate. Controlling for other demand and supply shocks in rows 4 
and 5 dampens this effect slightly, which however, remains a significant -0.294. 
These estimates indicate that a one percentage point increase in the migration rate 
decreases the native netflow rate by around 0.3 percentage points. However, this 
effect is substantially smaller, -0.036, when we control for district specific growth 
rate effects, over and above district specific effects in row 6 (Wright et al. 1997). In 
row 6a we restrict the sample to exclude London, which is a high migration area 
that could be driving the significance of our results (Wright et al. 1997; Card 2001; 
Borjas 2006). However the -0.029 estimate remains significant.  
Panels B and C show estimates at the county and region levels. When 
comparing the more complete specifications in row 5 (or 4) of each panel, the 
estimate is larger the smaller the aggregation level, as in Borjas (2006). However, 
when comparing row 6 of each panel, the estimate is larger the wider the 
aggregation level, suggesting that the earlier result was driven by omitted area 
specific growth rates.  
In sum, the estimates in Table 4 are negative and significant but small (see 
most complete specifications in rows 5 and 6 of each panel). This is reassuring 
that the correlation between the migration inflow rate and native netflow rate is not 
very large and any associated natives' mobility (omitted variable) bias is not too 
severe. This is in line with some evidence for the US, where little evidence was 
found that natives respond to migrants through mobility (Butcher and Card 1991; 
Wright et al. 1997; White and Liang 1998; Card and DiNardo 2000; Card 2001), 
though it is in contrast with other evidence where a stronger or larger association 
was found (Filer 1992; Frey 1995; Frey et al. 1996; Borjas et al. 1997; Borjas 
2006). The estimates here are also in line with (though smaller than) the limited 
evidence for the UK, which uses either time series models or regional and annual 
data (Muellbauer and Murphy 1988; Hatton and Tani 2005). Finally, the estimates 
here are in line with evidence of relative persistence of employment and 
unemployment differentials across UK regions, which suggests that mobility only 
facilitates labour market adjustments to a limited extent (Pissarides and McMaster 
  241990; Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Hatton and Tani 2005).  
 
5.4  Robustness Checks  
Our estimates in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest little evidence of adverse 
claimant unemployment effects. Having established that this is unlikely to be due to 
endogeneity severely biasing our estimates, we now further check the robustness 
of those estimates by restricting our sample to specific demographic groups. The 
motivation here is that those estimates are for the entire pool of unemployed 
workers, which might be diluting more adverse effects for low wage workers 
(LaLonde and Topel 1991; Altonji and Card 1991). Also, the mobility behaviour of 
low wage workers might be different, as we argue in Section 3 (Borjas 2006). We 
thus re-estimate Equation 1 for three groups, in turn: low skilled (those in 
elementary occupations), young (those between 18 and 24 years of age) and 
women. These are workers likely to be competing directly with WRS migrants (see 
Section 2.2). For example, employers might substitute away from mothers with 
small children or unskilled young workers and towards male migrants (House of 
Lords 2008; The Guardian 2008; Coats 2008).  
Table 5 shows the associated GLS   estimates. Row 1 shows an insignificant 
-0.021 estimate for low skilled workers at the district level (compare with the 
insignificant 0.037 estimate in row 4 of Panel A of Table 2). This suggests, if 
anything, a less adverse effect for the low skilled at the district level. The estimate 
is a more adverse but insignificant 0.043 when allowing low skilled workers to 
search for jobs at the county or region level. This suggests that low skilled are 
area-bound and offers little evidence that migrants are substitutes for low skilled 
natives (see Section 3).  
n β
Row 2 shows that for young workers, the estimates are more adverse the wider 
the aggregation level: an insignificant -0.30 (0.006) at the district (county) level, 
and a significant 0.106 at the region level. Thus an increase of one percentage 
point in the WRS migration rate increases UK youth claimant unemployment by 
0.106 percentage points when young workers' local labour market is within a 
region. This suggests that migrant labour might be a substitute for youth labour. It 
also suggests that young natives might be more mobile than other natives, and 
  25that more adverse effects at the region level might have been offset at the district 
and county levels (see Sections 3 and 5.1).  
In contrast, row 3 shows that for female workers the estimates do not change 
much across aggregation level. This suggests that women are area-bound, 
perhaps because they are tied movers/stayers (Borjas 2006). The insignificant 
0.015 and 0.020 estimates offer little evidence that migrants are substitutes for 
native women. 
We further check the robustness of our estimates by restricting our sample to 
areas with relatively high proportions of WRS migrants (see Figure 5). The 
motivation here is that our estimates for all areas might be diluting more adverse 
effects for affected areas. We thus estimate Equation 1, in turn for: London, the 
Southeast and Eastern areas and agricultural areas (comprising 5% or more of the 
working age population in agricultural jobs). 
Row 4 shows, interestingly, that for London, the Southeast and Eastern areas 
the estimates are less adverse the wider the aggregation level. The estimate is an 
insignificant 0.051 (-0.166) at the district (region) level, though it is a significant       
-0.055 at the county level. Thus an increase of one percentage point in the WRS 
migration rate decreases claimant unemployment by 0.055 percentage points in 
the London, Southeast and Eastern areas when natives' local labour market is 
within a county.  
Similarly, row 5 shows that for agricultural areas the estimates are less adverse 
the wider the aggregation level. The estimate is a significant 0.073 at the district 
level and an insignificant 0.043 and -0.014 at the county and region levels. Thus, 
an increase of one percentage point in the WRS migration rate increases claimant 
unemployment in UK agricultural areas by 0.073 percentage points when natives' 
local labour market is within a district. This suggests that competition among native 
agricultural workers and migrants takes place in small neighbourhoods.
14 
Thus, our main conclusion from before is broadly maintained. We found only 
sparse evidence that an increase in the WRS migration rate adversely affected the 
claimant unemployment rate in the UK between 2004 and 2006. While low skilled 
                                            
14 Here we address, to some extent, concerns that measurement error in our migration variable 
arising from non-random outflow could bias our estimates (see Sections 2.1 and 3.2). Even though 
outflows have a more systematic seasonal component in agriculture, these estimates do not 
suggest substantially more adverse effects than their unrestricted counterparts in Table 2. 
  26and female claimant unemployment was not adversely affected, we found a small 
adverse effect for young natives at the region level. Similarly, while claimant 
unemployment was not adversely affected in London, the Southeast and Eastern 
areas, we found a small adverse effect in agricultural areas at the district level. 
 
5.5  National and Occupational Level Effects 
A further way to check the robustness of our estimates in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 
is by aggregating the data across occupations. As discussed in Section 3, 
stratification across occupations – as opposed to stratification across areas – is 
fruitful because migrants and natives compete more directly across occupations 
and because bias arising from natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection is less 
of a concern across occupations.  
Thus, we re-estimate Equation 1 replacing   with   to mean 
occupations (see Section 2.2)
15 and re-defining  , due to data limitations, to 
include the lagged proportion of WRS migrants who are women, young and 
parents (along with average number of children); their lagged average hours 
worked; the lagged proportion of unemployed who are women and young; and the 
lagged average claim duration.  
i 9 ,..., 1 = j
jt X
Row 1 of Panel A of Table 6 shows an insignificant 0.055 (unweighted OLS) 
 estimate, which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 7. Our baseline (GLS) 
estimate in row 2, where occupation fixed effects are controlled for, is an 
insignificant 0.019. Controlling for month fixed effects and demand and supply 
shocks in rows 3 and 4 yields insignificant 0.030 and 0.017 estimates. Restricting 
the sample in row 4a to exclude machine operative occupations, where self-
selection bias might be a concern (see Section 3.1), yields an insignificant -0.049 
estimate, which suggests, if anything, less adverse effects (see Section 5.6).  
n β
Thus, our main conclusion from before of little evidence of adverse claimant 
unemployment effects is again maintained. This is in contrast with results in Borjas 
(2006), where more adverse effects were found at wider aggregation levels. 
Although our results were also successively larger at the district, county and region 
                                            
15 Results using sought occupation, which better captures labour market effects, were also robust 
to using usual occupation instead.  
  27levels, they are smaller at the nation level – and they are insignificant throughout 
(see Tables 2 and 6). As we argued in Sections 3.2 and 5.1, natives' mobility might 
not fully explain larger effects in wider areas. Furthermore, our results in Sections 
5.1 to 5.4 suggest that natives' mobility responses to the WRS migration shock 
were modest and might only have facilitated labour market adjustments to a very 
limited extent, if anything. 
Nonetheless we check whether these small estimates at the national-
occupation level are driven by omitted area fixed effects by aggregating the data at 
the regional-occupation level. As we argue in Section 3, the later might be more 
relevant, as low-skilled natives, who are more region-bound, are more likely to 
compete with WRS migrants. We re-estimate Equation 1, where i and  j  are 
defined as before, and   includes the same variables as  .   ijt X jt X
Panel B shows that the insignificant 0.054, 0.020 and 0.030 estimates in rows 1 
to 3 remain stubbornly close to their counterparts in Panel A, where region, time 
and occupation fixed effects, as well as their interactions, are controlled for. 
Further controlling for demand and supply shocks yields a larger but insignificant 
0.056 estimate in row 4. Thus, our main conclusion from before of little evidence of 
adverse claimant unemployment effects is yet again maintained.  
In sum, the estimates at the national-occupation and at the regional-
occupational level do not differ much. This confirms that low-skilled natives are 
relatively region-bound; it also confirms that there is little evidence that native 
mobility offset more adverse effects (see Sections 5.1 to 5.4). Our results are again 
in contrast with those in Borjas (2003), who reports substantially smaller estimates 
when labour markets stratified by education-experience are limited by geographical 
boundaries. However, our results are in line with those in Card (2001), who reports 
small employment effects even when labour markets stratified by occupation are 
limited by geographical boundaries and does not find evidence that native mobility 
offset more adverse effects. 
 
5.6 Wage  Effects 
One explanation for little evidence of adverse claimant unemployment effects is 
that the adjustment to the WRS inflow occurred through wages, as some have 
  28suggested (Blanchflower et al. 2007) and as theory predicts (see Sections 3.2 and 
6). We thus estimate the effect of the WRS migration inflow on UK wages using a 
reduced form equation grounded on standard theory (Borjas 1999; Card 2001; 








iy f X M W ε λ β ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ = ∆                        (3) 
where   and   are our wage and migration variables, defined in Section 3.2, 
in district   and year 
iy W iy M ∆
409 ,..., 1 = i 3 ,..., 1 = y ;   is time fixed effects;   is the error 
term; and   are labour demand and supply shifters that, due to data limitations, 
now include the proportion of the total population who are women, young, ethnic 
minorities and migrants from outside the A8 countries; the lagged proportion of 
WRS migrants who are women, young and parents (along with average number of 
children). As before, we estimate Equation 3 in first-difference using GLS and thus 
area fixed effects were differenced out; time fixed effects are now modelled using 
year dummies. The interpretation of our coefficient of interest is that a one 







Row 1 of Panel A of Table 7 shows a 0.125 (unweighted OLS)   estimate, 
which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 7. Our baseline (GLS) estimate in 
Panel B, where district fixed effects are controlled for, is a larger but insignificant 
0.216 estimate. Further controlling for respectively year fixed effects and demand 
and supply shocks in Panels C and D yields larger but still insignificant 0.252 and 
0.246 estimates.  
w β








th percentiles of the log hourly pay distribution. This is to 
uncover potential wage effects for lower paid workers that might have been 
masked by the average wage effect. Panel A shows negative estimates – except 
for the 5
th percentile, where the operation of a higher minimum wage might be 
driving the results (see Figures 2 and 3). Some of these estimates remain negative 
and insignificant in our baseline specification in Panel B, but all turn positive, 
though remain insignificant, when we control for time effects in Panel C – the 5
th 
percentile estimate is now less than a half, as the effect of the national minimum 
wage increase is controlled for. The estimates remain positive and insignificant 
iy W
  29when we control for demand and supply shocks in Panel D. They are 0.110, 0.323 




16 This suggests that 
wage effects are smaller at the bottom of the distribution, where migrants and 
natives are more likely to be substitutes (e.g. those in elementary occupations are 
located around the 5
th and 10
th percentiles), and larger higher up, where migrants 
and natives are more likely to be complements (e.g. those in machine operative 
occupations are located around the 40
th percentile).
17 Nonetheless, as the 
estimates are insignificant throughout, our main conclusion is that there is little 
evidence that an increase in the WRS migration rate adversely affected wages in 
the UK between 2004 and 2006.  
Our estimates are in line with some evidence in the international literature, 
where adverse wage effects are small (Grossman 1982; Friedberg 2001; Card 
1990, 2001, 2005 and 2007; Carrasco et al. 2008), though in contrast with other 
evidence of more adverse wage effects (Borjas 1999, 2003 and 2006; Angrist and 
Kugler 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). They are also in line with the limited 
evidence available for the UK (Dustmann et al. 2005 and 2007; Manacorda et al. 
2006). Using LFS data for the 1980s and 1990s, Dustmann et al. (2005) found no 
evidence of adverse wage effects and hinted that this might be in part because 
migrants' skill distribution resembles that of natives. However, Manacorda et al. 
(2006) argue that the associated relative labour supply change ought to have 
induced wage effects. Using LFS and BHPS data between the 1970s and 2000s 
they also found no adverse wage effects and argue that this is because natives 
and migrants are imperfect substitutes (Card 1990; Friedberg 2001). They then 
detected some adverse wage effects for earlier migrants (LaLonde and Topel 
1991; Altonji and Card 1991). This is in line with findings in Dustmann et al. (2007) 
of negative wage effects at the bottom of the distribution – where migrants are 
more concentrated – and positive effects higher up the distribution, when using 
LFS data for the 1990s and 2000s.  
                                            
16 We also run robustness checks controlling for lagged working age population growth and natives 
netflow rate, as in Section 5.1, but the estimates remained positive, small and insignificant, 
indicating, as before, that any natives' mobility omitted variable bias is not too severe. 
17 Claimant unemployment effects were not more adverse when we excluded machine operatives 
(see Table 6), as might have been expected if demand factors attracted both migrants and 
(claimant) natives (see Section 2.2). An explanation here is that such demand factors were 
controlled for in the model. Another explanation is that natives other than claimants were attracted. 
Yet another explanation is that adjustment happened mainly through higher wages. 
  30Given that WRS migrants overwhelmingly concentrate around the 5th and 10th 
percentiles of the wage distribution, we also expected to find more adverse (or less 
favourable) effects there. Our estimates were indeed smaller at the bottom than 
higher up the distribution, but they were insignificant throughout. Although 
Dustmann et al. (2007) found significant instrumented estimates; their associated 
uninstrumented estimates were also insignificant throughout the distribution. For 
example, our insignificant 0.246 estimate of the average effect is close to their 
insignificant 0.266 uninstrumented estimate, though smaller than their associated 
significant 0.396 instrumented estimate.
18 In contrast with Dustmann et al. (2007), 
our instrumented estimates are often less precise than our uninstrumented 
estimates (see Tables 2 and 3). Also, endogeneity bias is less of a concern here 
because the supply shock we study is more exogenous (see Section 3). 
 
6. Discussion 
Our main conclusion is that there is little evidence that the WRS migration 
inflow adversely affected wages or claimant unemployment in the UK between 
2004 and 2006. This conclusion is in line with the limited evidence available for the 
UK (Dustmann et al. 2005 and 2007; Manacorda et al. 2006) and with some 
(mainly US) international evidence (Chiswick 1978; Grossman 1982; Altonji and 
Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991; Pischke and Velling 1997; Friedberg 2001; 
Card 1990, 2001, 2005 and 2007; Carrasco et al. 2008), though in contrast with 
other evidence of more adverse effects (Borjas 1999, 2003 and 2006; Angrist and 
Kugler 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). 
Our wage effect estimates are positive, small and insignificant, smaller at the 
bottom of the distribution. Our unemployment effect estimates are small and in the 
main insignificant. These estimates are in line with our earlier descriptive analysis 
                                            
18 Our insignificant 0.323 and 0.438 estimates for the 25
th and 50
th percentiles are larger than their 
0.136 and 0.234 insignificant estimates (their associated instrumented estimates are an 
insignificant 0.211 and a significant 0.660). Finally, our insignificant 0.110 estimate for the 10
th 
percentile is again close to their insignificant uninstrumented -0.094 estimate (their associated 
significant instrumented estimate is -0.516), though in the opposite direction. One explanation here 
is that the minimum wage was in force and increasing throughout the period we study, possibly 
mitigating or offsetting potentially more adverse wage effects for lower paid workers (see Figures 2 
and 3). One fruitful avenue of research is to extend the sample period in Dustmann et al. (2007) 
accordingly. Another fruitful avenue of research is to estimate the effect of the WRS inflow on the 
wages of earlier migrants (unfeasible here because ASHE does not record nationality). 
  31and are robust to a number of specification checks and estimation methods as well 
as to several different stratifications of the labour market and to different sub-
samples of workers. In particular, we have thoroughly checked the robustness of 
our estimates to two main identification issues that underline the debate in the 
literature: natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection. 
The crucial point was to establish whether the location and occupation choice 
of migrants was strongly driven by local labour market conditions and whether 
natives strongly responded to migration inflows by moving to other areas, which 
would invalidate the cross-areas migration analysis. We established that neither 
source of endogeneity was strong enough to severely bias our estimates. We 
stratified labour markets in various dimensions – district, county, region, nation-
occupation, region-occupation, agriculture, low-skilled, young and female – to test 
alternative assumptions on the substitutability between migrants and natives. 
Firstly, we allowed migrants and natives to compete across ever wider areas and 
found small positive and insignificant estimates. Secondly, our estimates were if 
anything smaller and insignificant when we allowed migrants and natives to 
compete on a national labour market across occupations. Thirdly, our estimates 
were still small positive and insignificant when we explicitly controlled for natives' 
mobility using two different proxies. Fourthly, our instrumented estimates remained 
small and insignificant (turned negative), when we corrected for potential 
correlation between the migration variable and omitted (migrants' self-selection 
and natives' mobility) variables. Finally, we estimated a small correlation (which is 
a measure of the extent of the potential bias) between the migration variable and 
natives' mobility. 
In sum, our estimates are reassuringly small and insignificant across a number 
of specifications, sub-samples and estimation methods and are not sensitive to the 
counterfactual underlying each model. In particular, our results do not appear to be 
driven by endogeneity bias – we found no evidence that migrants' self-selection or 
natives' mobility offset more adverse effects. 
While these results are robust and in line with other available evidence, they 
are puzzling. This is because standard theory only predicts no adverse wages and 
employment effects when migrants' skill composition resembles that of natives – 
i.e. when the migration inflow is balanced across area or skill. If the inflow 
  32increases relative labour supply in a particular area or skill, then downward 
pressure on wages and employment is expected. In particular, the wage structure 
should be affected: competing (complement) workers should have lower (higher) 
wages. Given that the WRS inflow was large, rapid and not balanced across areas 
or occupations, and given the little evidence of adjustment in wages or claimant 
unemployment, the obvious question is how the UK labour market adjusted.  
Usual answers include factor equalization as well as industry structure and 
output mix adjustments. The first explanation is that internal flows of goods, capital 
and labour (i.e. natives' mobility) equalize labour market opportunities across areas 
or skills following a migration inflow (Card 1990 and 2005; LaLonde and Topel 
1991; Borjas 1999 and 2006; Friedberg 2001; Lewis 2003; Dustmann and Glitz 
2005). Yet, evidence of persistency in regional wage and employment differentials 
in the US and UK following other adverse shocks make it implausible that markets 
adjust instantaneously to migration shocks (Borjas 1994; Card 2001) – especially 
one as large, rapid and concentrated as the WRS. Furthermore, this explanation 
implies that there are unobserved factors correlated with the migration variable that 
would severely bias wage and employment coefficients away from adverse effects. 
Yet, despite some evidence of instrumental variable bias correction, adverse 
effects remain modest (Card 2001 and 2005; Dustmann and Glitz 2005) – in 
particular, we found little evidence of endogeneity severely biasing our estimates. 
The second explanation is that firms adjust their production function and 
production mix to take advantage of the shift in the relative supply of labour. This 
might be an appealing explanation in a small open economy such as the UK 
(Friedberg 2001; Dustmann et al. 2005; Card 2007). Yet, the available (mostly US) 
evidence suggests that industry structure changes offer little explanation on how 
large migration inflows are absorbed (Card 1990 and 2005; Hunt 1992; Friedberg 
2001; Lewis 2003; Dustmann and Glitz 2005) – again, it seems implausible that UK 
firms would adjust instantaneously to a migration shock as large, rapid and 
concentrated as the WRS.  
Although neither explanation offers an immediate solution to the puzzle, a 
fruitful avenue for future research is more UK based evidence on both fronts. That 
would help to understand how native workers respond to competition from 
migrants and how firms alter their production function and production mix in 
  33response to the relative labour supply shift.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Following the enlargement of the EU in May 2004, there was a large, rapid and 
concentrated inflow of accession migrants into the UK. We described and 
evaluated the impact of this inflow on the UK labour market. Despite anecdotal 
evidence, we found little hard evidence that the inflow of accession migrants 
contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant unemployment in the UK 
between 2004 and 2006. 
This new evidence is an important contribution to the very limited UK migration 
literature – in particular, it helps to fill a gap in the literature on the effects of the 
recent EU enlargement. This new evidence is also an important contribution to the 
international literature because it applies a thorough and comprehensive empirical 
estimation approach to new and rich monthly micro datasets to study a large, rapid 
and concentrated new migration inflow – which can be seen as a natural 
experiment that arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock 
than most migration shocks studied in the literature – and this helps to circumvent 
identification issues that underline the debate in the literature.  
Most crucially, this new evidence is an important contribution to informing 
policymaking on the face of further EU enlargements. Given the heated public 
debated on migration – and in particular on migration from accession countries – 
this is a timely contribution. For example, the relatively benign evidence for the UK 
might have helped policymakers' decisions in ten other EU countries to either lift or 
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Source: Worker Registration Scheme data, Jobseeker's Allowance data and Labour Force Survey data
Figure 1 - Unemployment and Employment
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note: ASHE does include WRS migrants
comprises 90% of WRS migrants and 30% of ASHE native workers
















































































note: ASHE does include WRS migrants
   
Natives at or below £7
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings data
Figure 2 – Hourly Wage Distributions
 









































































































































































































































Figure 3 - Wage Growth
Source: Average Earnings Index data (seasonally adjusted), Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings data and Worker Registration Scheme data
 Figure 4 – Migration Inflow Rate by Regions 
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native persons netflow in London
native persons netflow in England excluding London
native persons netflow in Wales Scotland and Northern Ireland




































































































native persons netflow 2002 to 2004
migrants inflow 2004 to 2006
native persons netflow 2004 to 2006
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and Office for National Statistics Migration Indicators data
Figure 5 – Migrants and Natives by Regions
 
















































































































































































































native claimants stock by usual occupation




















































































































































































































native claimants stock by usual occupation
native claimants stock by sought occupation
migrants inflow
Elementary Occupations
Figure 6 - Migrants and Claimants by Occupations
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and Jobbseeker's Allowance data
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Migrants and Native Persons
Figure 7 – Migration and Unemployment Rates and Wage Growth
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data, Jobbseeker's Allowance data, Office for National Statistics Migration Indicators data and Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings data
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Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS                                                            
VARIABLES WRS JSA ASHE LFS
May 2004 - May 2006 May 2004 - May 2006 May 2004 - May 2006 April 2004 - June 2006
migrants claimants workers UK born Overseas born
I - POPULATION VARIABLES - % of those who are:
Aged:
under 16 years old 0.00 - na na 0.21 0.08
16 to 24 years old 0.37 0.30 na na 0.12 0.11
25 to 34 years old 0.45 0.24 na na 0.12 0.24
35 to 64 years old 0.18 0.45 na na 0.40 0.44
over 65 years old 0.00 0.00 na na 0.16 0.13
Women 0.43 0.74 na na 0.51 0.52
Parents (with dependent children) 0.06 na na na 0.27 0.32
Blacks -n a n a n a 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 2
Asians -n a n a n a 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 5
Nationality:
Polish 0.61 na na na - 0.02
Lithuanian 0.12 na na na - 0.01
Slovakian 0.10 na na na - 0.00
Lativian 0.07 na na na - 0.00
Located in:
London 0.17 0.19 na na 0.09 0.41
South East 0.14 0.08 na na 0.14 0.13
East of England 0.12 0.07 na na 0.09 0.08
East Midlands 0.09 0.06 na na 0.07 0.05
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.08 0.09 na na 0.09 0.06
West Midlands 0.08 0.11 na na 0.09 0.07
North West 0.08 0.12 na na 0.12 0.07
South West 0.08 0.05 na na 0.09 0.05
Scotland 0.08 0.10 na na 0.09 0.04
Northern Ireland 0.04 0.03 na na 0.03 0.01
Wales 0.03 0.05 na na 0.05 0.02
North East 0.01 0.05 na na 0.05 0.02
II - LABOUR MARKET VARIABLES - % of those who are in:
Occupations:
elementary occupations 0.46 0.35 na na 0.11 0.14
machine operatives occupations 0.32 0.10 na na 0.08 0.07
skilled trades occupations 0.06 0.11 na na 0.12 0.08
personal services occupations 0.04 0.05 na na 0.08 0.08
unknown occupation  0.04 0.01 na na 0.00 0.00
sales and customer service occupations 0.03 0.13 na na 0.08 0.07
administrative occupations 0.03 0.10 na na 0.13 0.09
professional occupations 0.01 0.04 na na 0.12 0.17
managers and senior officials 0.01 0.04 na na 0.15 0.15
technical occupations 0.01 0.06 na na 0.14 0.15
Sectors: na na
manufacturing 0.31 na na na 0.13 0.11
distribution, hotels & restaurants 0.27 na na na 0.19 0.21
transport & communication 0.09 na na na 0.07 0.08
agriculture and Fishing 0.08 na na na 0.01 0.01
banking, finance & insurance etc 0.08 na na na 0.15 0.19
public admin, educ & health 0.06 na na na 0.28 0.28
construction 0.04 na na na 0.08 0.05
other services 0.02 na na na 0.06 0.06
energy and water 0.00 na na na 0.01 0.01
Part time 0.08 na na na 0.26 0.22
Employment rate - - na na 0.76 0.67
Unemployment rate - - na na 0.05 0.07
Average claim duration - 31.32 na na - -
Looking for a job in their usual occupation - 0.84 na na - -
Average hours worked 37.83 - na na 36.87 38.37
2004 2006
5th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.50 na 4.77 5.16 4.50 4.61
10th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.65 na 5.14 5.55 5.26 5.31
20th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.85 na 5.99 6.45 6.15 6.22
25th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.85 na 6.43 6.95 6.58 6.69
30th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.87 na 6.92 7.45 7.02 7.19
40th percentile hourly wage distribution 5.00 na 7.95 8.55 7.98 8.34
50th percentile hourly wage distribution 5.05 na 9.18 9.89 9.06 9.59
Average hourly wage distribution 5.56 na 12.04 13.09 11.02 11.88
Standard deviation hourly wage distribution 2.03 na na na 7.16 8.01
Adult minimum wage 4.80 na 4.50 5.05 4.80 4.80
number of observations 562830 22016120 21915 23725 201294305 21169990
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data, Jobseeker's Allowance data, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings and Labour Force Survey
(1) Variables not available or not defined in a particular dataset are indicated by "na".  For example, the employment and unemployment rates are not definied for the WRS ASHE or JSA, where all individuals are working/unemployed.  
The proportion of parents from the LFS is for 2006 Q2, where the household weight used is based on 2003 population estimates as re-weighted household datasets are yet unavailable (the other figures are based on 2007 population estimates). 
(2) As ASHE is not available at the micro level, we are unable to compute percentiles for the period 2004-2006; we instead report percentiles for 2004 and 2006 directly from the ASHE tables. Similarly, standard deviation is not available.  
(3) As detailed in the text (see Section 2), the WRS measures inflows, whereas the JSA and LFS measure stocks.  Therefore, the WRS figures are cumulative.
(4) National minimum wage (adult rate) is: £4.50 between 1 October 2003 and 30 September 2004; £4.85 between 1 October 2004 and 30 September 2005; £5.05 between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2006.  
 
 Table 2 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRATION
Models coefficient standard errors
A - District Level
(1) Raw coefficient -0.015 0.015
(2) Baseline specification -0.044 0.027
(3) Adding time effects  -0.051 0.054
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.037 0.087
(5) Adding working age population growth 0.020 0.075
(6) Adding native netflow rate 0.003 0.078
B - County Level
(1) Raw coefficient -0.072 0.045
(2) Baseline specification -0.112 0.053
(3) Adding time effects  0.085 0.065
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.071 0.078
(5) Adding working age population growth 0.062 0.085
(6) Adding native netflow rate 0.057 0.086
C - Region Level
(1) Raw coefficient -0.161 0.166
(2) Baseline specification 0.047 0.078
(3) Adding time effects  0.274 0.053
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.134 0.081
(5) Adding working age population growth 0.119 0.108
(6) Adding native netflow rate 0.115 0.106
(a) These are GLS estimates weighted by the sample size used to calculate the dependent variable (except in row 1, where OLS unweighted estimates are shown).
(b) The dependent variable is the UK claimant unemployment rate and the independent variable of interest is the WRS migration rate (see Sections 3 and 4). 
(c) Time fixed effects are modeled with month dummies; area fixed effects are differenced out.  See Section 4 for discussion on demand and supply controls.
(d) The interpretation of the coefficient is that a 1 percentage point increase in the WRS migration rate changes the UK claimant unemployment





  46 Table 3 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRANTION (Instrumented)
Hansen-Sargan test Hausman test       F test
Models coefficient standard errors statistic df statistic df statistic df
A - District Level
(1) Lagged migration rates -0.029 0.020 21.95 4 0.02 1 337.75 5 7310
(2) Lagged entry-migration rates  -0.024 0.023 11.18 3 0.00 1 124.05 4 7718
(3) Historic migration rates (Census) -0.144 0.071 0.03 1 3.47 1 109.84 2 8534
(4) Historic migration rates (IPS) -0.102 0.140 2.74 1 0.28 1 20.65 2 8534
(5) Flight indicator interacted with distance between UK districts and A8 countries -0.137 0.061 23.56 13 2.55 1 17.01 14 8522
B - County Level
(1) Lagged migration rates -0.104 0.054 11.36 4 0.00 1 122.77 5 1028
(2) Lagged entry-migration rates  -0.104 0.062 5.40 3 0.26 1 47.98 4 1087
(3) Historic migration rates (Census) -0.106 0.202 3.70 1 0.06 1 15.25 2 1205
(4) Historic migration rates (IPS) -0.087 0.244 1.45 1 0.01 1 12.30 2 1205
(5) Flight indicator interacted with distance between UK districts and A8 countries -0.139 0.067 22.23 13 1.27 1 16.64 14 1193
C - Region Level
(1) Lagged migration rates -0.222 0.134 5.05 4 2.52 1 78.81 5 182
(2) Lagged entry-migration rates  -0.174 0.169 3.27 3 0.16 1 28.78 41 9 4
(3) Historic migration rates (Census) -0.087 0.174 3.59 1 0.77 1 42.54 22 1 8
(4) Historic migration rates (IPS) -0.045 0.220 0.49 1 0.11 1 22.07 22 1 8
(5) Flight indicator interacted with distance between UK districts and A8 countries -0.072 0.107 9.55 10 2.88 1 24.50 11 211
(a) Notes as in Table 2, excetp that these are now GMM estimates.









  47 Table 4 - NATIVE MOBILITY EFFECTS OF MIGRATION
Models
A - District Level
(1) Raw coefficient  -0.182 0.012
(2) Baseline specificaiton -0.282 0.005
(3) Adding time effects -0.301 0.006
(4) Adding working age population growth, wage growth and unemployment rate change -0.293 0.006
(5) Adding house prices inflation and vacancies change -0.294 0.006
(6) Adding area specific growth rate -0.036 0.001
     (6a) Excluding London -0.029 0.002
B - County Level
(1) Raw coefficient  0.058 0.022
(2) Baseline specificaiton -0.080 0.001
(3) Adding time effects -0.098 0.001
(4) Adding working age population growth, wage growth and unemployment rate change -0.056 0.002
(5) Adding house prices inflation and vacancies change -0.088 0.003
(6) Adding area specific growth rate -0.058 0.003
     (6a) Excluding London -0.045 0.001
C - Region Level
(1) Raw coefficient  -0.210 0.109
(2) Baseline specificaiton -0.323 0.011
(3) Adding time effects -0.539 0.019
(4) Adding working age population growth, wage growth and unemployment rate change -0.010 0.004
(5) Adding house prices inflation and vacancies change -0.066 0.009
(6) Adding area specific growth rate -0.124 0.013
     (6a) Excluding London -0.075 0.010





  48 Table 5 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRATION (robustness checks)
Models coefficient standard errors
A - District Level
(1) Low Skilled -0.021 0.028
(2) Young -0.030 0.033
(3) Female 0.015 0.017
(4) London Southeast and Eastern 0.051 0.057
(5) Agriculture 0.073 0.014
B - County Level
(1) Low Skilled 0.043 0.029
(2) Young 0.006 0.028
(3) Female 0.020 0.013
(4) London Southeast and Eastern -0.055 0.014
(5) Agriculture 0.043 0.037
C - Region Level
(1) Low Skilled 0.043 0.041
(2) Young 0.106 0.038
(3) Female 0.015 0.024
(4) London Southeast and Eastern -0.166 0.278
(5) Agriculture -0.014 0.070
(a) Notes as in Table 2.








  49 Table 6 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRATION (by occupation)
Models coefficient standard errors
A - Occupation Level
(1) Raw coefficient  0.055 0.068
(2) Baseline specification  0.019 0.031
(3) Adding time effects 0.030 0.038
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.017 0.025
      (4a) Excluding machine operative occupations -0.049 0.089
B - Occupation-Region Level
(1) Raw coefficient  0.054 0.022
(2) Baseline specification  0.020 0.018
(3) Adding time time-area and time-occupation fixed effects  0.030 0.096
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.056 0.066













  50 Table 7 - WAGE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION
Models (A) Raw coefficient (B) Baseline specification (C) Adding time effects (D) Adding demand and supply contro
coefficient standard errors coefficient standard errors coefficient standard errors coefficient standard errors
(1) Average wage 0.125 0.230 0.216 0.237 0.252 0.278 0.246 0.276
(2) 5th percentile  0.265 0.195 0.380 0.286 0.145 0.187 0.212 0.190
(3) 10th percentile  -0.249 0.183 -0.383 0.234 0.086 0.226 0.110 0.220
(4) 20th percentile -0.553 0.213 -0.428 0.281 0.168 0.299 0.162 0.305
(5) 25th percentile -0.260 0.214 -0.135 0.270 0.315 0.305 0.323 0.313
(6) 30th percentile -0.209 0.221 -0.030 0.214 0.346 0.234 0.365 0.239
(7) 40th percentile -0.129 0.220 0.135 0.216 0.462 0.249 0.453 0.250
(8) 50th percentile -0.261 0.241 0.007 0.260 0.469 0.308 0.438 0.307
(a) Notes as in Table 2, except that the dependent variable is now the average and various percentiles of the wage distribution across years and districts.    
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